Introduction
During the 2012 presidential election, a 25-year-old man with Down syndrome named Clinton Gode gained national publicity for his commitment to civic participation. Gode, the spokesperson for Arizona House Bill 2377, was granted the ability to cast his vote after appearing before a judge and insisting that his decision could not be swayed by the intervention of an external party, such as a caretaker. The bill amended a previous statute, which did not allow "incapacitated persons" to vote. The revision reads, In cases of limited guardianship only, a person is not deemed an incapacitated person for purposes of voting if the person files a petition, has a hearing and the judge determines by clear and convincing evidence that the person retains sufficient understanding to exercise the right to vote. (State, my emphasis) Gode's victory was lauded as a step forward for the disability rights movement and, according to progressive media such as Mother Jones, dispelled assumptions about the incompetency of people with mental disabilities (Pan) .
Upon closer inspection of the amendment, however, it seems that little has changed about the intense scrutiny requisite for voting in the United States. Limited or no guardianship is the first condition for obtaining exception to the category of "incapacitated persons," and one must also compile a petition, arrange a hearing, and present oneself as sound of mind to the court. This juridical surveillance mandated for people with mental disabilities undercuts the agency granted by the outcome of initiatives such as HB 2377.
While it suits progressive audiences to view Gode's case as a victory, doing so increases the systematic surveillance of people with mental disabilities, keeps the category of "incapacitated persons" largely intact, and continues to value independence over interdependence. HB 2377's veiled call to make voting more accountable resonates with a different register: one of race and citizenship. In light of Gode's case, as well as the US Supreme Court's 2013 decision to eliminate key components of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, a law intended to defuse racist exclusions in US democratic practices, a discussion of the ways in which we understand and represent fit citizenship is more urgent than ever.
Here, I discuss recent scholarship on blackness and disability and connect this work with considerations of mental disability and citizenship. I then turn to the politically themed performances curated by disc jockey and television star Howard Stern, who frequently features disabled actors on his shows, including mentally disabled African American entertainer Lester "Beetlejuice" Green. When Green guest stars, Stern mocks his civic fitness by taunting him and dressing Green in various patriotic costumes that represent American masculinity, such as Uncle Sam, a senatorial candidate, a Vietnam veteran, and Superman.1 While we could simply dismiss this as one more example of Howard Stern's mocking anyone and everyone, Beetlejuice's performances point to a larger and more important phenomenon in American history wherein mental fitness is used to question civic fitness. Simultaneously, Beetlejuice's performances, I argue, trouble the well-worn paradigm of exploitation versus agency that surrounds the labor of people who are mentally disabled. Taking a cue from Julie Minich's recent work on disability and citizenship, which argues that "the corporeal images used to depict national belonging have important consequences for how the rights and obligations of citizenship are distributed," my analysis of Stern and Beetlejuice extends 1. Although the US pop-cultural attraction to freak-show imagery clearly influences Stern's aesthetics of domination, I am more concerned with provoking a timely discussion regarding the definitional and disciplinary issues of race and mental disability in disability studies and the larger public sphere. For more on racialized enfreakment, see Bogdan; Garland-Thomson, Freakery; and Adams. these "corporeal images" to include the visual representation of mental disability (2).
Representations of citizenship in the USA have consistently ostracized certain subjects along both racist and ableist lines. More specifically, the historical designation of people of color and people with disabilities as "unfit" signifies not merely an analogy between those discourses but rather their fundamental intertwining. Mental capacity has served as a central litmus test for civic inclusion and therefore merits closer inspection in discussions of disability rights. Michael Bérubé succinctly conveys the importance of visual representation as regards civil rights and mental disability when he writes, "our society's representations of disability are intricately tied to, and sometimes the very basis for, our public policies for 'administering' disability […] the visual and rhetorical representations of 'feebleminded' persons […] set the terms for public policy" (Bérubé) . Although it is frequently perceived as a non-apparent condition, mental disability is also visually constructed through media and performance, and the rhetoric of these forms, I contend alongside Bérubé, directly influences whom is deemed fit for civic participation.
Building on this analysis, I conclude by invoking the 2013 murder trial of George Zimmerman, who shot unarmed African American teenager Trayvon Martin on February 26, 2012. I specifically discuss the testimony of Martin's friend Rachel Jeantel, whose testimony provoked a media firestorm of racialized and ableist stereotypes. In an allegedly post-Jim Crow and post-eugenics US context, mental ability and civic fitness are always-already racialized. The interdependent representations of disability, race, and citizenship determine, in the words of Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, "who should and should not inhabit the world" ("Why Disability?"). Thus, rather than simply critiquing the exclusion of people of color and people with disabilities in terms of democratic ideals, I point to how the imbricated issues of race and disability both enable and fundamentally challenge the fantasy of democratic citizenship.
Black (Mental) Disability Studies
Chris Bell's frequently cited 2006 essay, "Introducing White Disability Studies: A Modest Proposal," critiques the spectacular whiteness of disability studies while noting that "too much critical work in African American Studies posits the African American body politic in an ableist (read non-disabled) fashion" (3). According to Bell, by critiquing the association of damage with the black mind and body, both disability studies and African American studies have incidentally erased black disability.2 Scholars such as Bell and Douglas Baynton reason that African Americans have distanced themselves from mental disability because it was historically wielded to justify the consistent negation of their civil rights. This aversion to discussing mental disability and blackness continues in the present day, in part because of the continued segregation of black students into special-education classes that stems from racialized and ableist assumptions.3 In heeding the call of Bell and others, my assertion is that race, mental disability, citizenship, and performance are particularly underexplored territories for disability studies.
Disability studies has also been critiqued for its emphasis on physical disability to the exclusion of mental disability. When the field does take up mental disability, terminological discussions vacillate between the usage of "mental," "intellectual," "developmental," and "cognitive" disability, demonstrating the instability of this category. Disability and rhetoric scholar Cynthia LewieckiWilson proposes mental disability as an umbrella term for both "mental illness and severe mental retardation" because it "focus[es] attention on the problem of granting rhetoricity to the mentally disabled" (157). Philosopher Eva Feder Kittay also favors the term mental disability, observing that mental retardation […] is the disability that other disabled persons do not want attributed to them […] . Many individuals with mental retardation, especially when it is severe or profound or compounded by other disabilities, have been unaffected by the important strides made by other people with disabilities. (557) Despite advances made by neurodiversity and mad pride activists, self-advocacy, as Kittay notes, is still the locus of mental disability activism.4
As disability scholars and activists we often seek models of disabled agency and resistance. But progressive narratives cannot encompass the ethical complexities of mental disability. Although it is often impossible for a minoritized subject to be seen as purely agential in choosing how, where, 2. Much rich scholarship responds to Bell's call, including Burch and Joyner; Erevelles and Minear; Garland-Thomson, Extraordinary; Lukin; James; Jarman; Pickens; Samuels; and Schalk. 3. "Black students in racially desegregated schools," philosopher Anna Stubblefield notes, "are disproportionately labeled as having mild mental retardation or emotional impairment and are placed in special education and remedial classes," resulting in a kind of "resegregation" (qtd in Carlson and Kittay 293). 4. Mahmood aptly calls attention to the dominance-versus-resistance model that characterizes much feminist critique. In the desire to recover agency, feminist theorists, Mahmood argues, have valorized resistance as the primary manifestation of agency: "Does the category of resistance," Mahmood asks, "impose a teleology of progressive politics on the analytics of power-a teleology that makes it hard for us to see and understand forms of being and action that are not necessarily encapsulated by the narrative of subversion and reinscription of norms?" (9). and why they perform, the mentally disabled performer is an especially fraught territory of analysis. As Catherine Prendergast argues, "to be disabled mentally is to be disabled rhetorically" (57). When speaking (and performing) as a mentally disabled subject, one is denied what Prendergast calls "rhetoricability," that is, the ability to be received as a valid subject. This validation, as Lewiecki-Wilson notes, requires a "broadened concept of rhetoric to include collaborative and mediated rhetorics that work with the performative rhetoric of bodies that 'speak' with/out language" (157). As Beetlejuice's case indicates, the denial of rhetoricability in everyday life and performance stems from the belief that he does not contribute to a "productive" capitalist society and therefore does not earn the full status of citizenship. This working definition of citizenship hinges on its performative aspects: namely, who appears to fulfill civil duties and contribute to a productive society through their possession of an unmarked mind and body.5
In more recent discussions of mental disability, scholars and activists have adopted the term intellectual disability to distance cognitive disability from the stigma of "mental retardation," which "mental disability" risks echoing. However, this term's focus on "intellect," defined as the capacity to reason, risks recentering liberal humanist rationality, a dangerous category for disabled and racialized people alike.6 As Allison Carey contends, "The assertion that people with disabilities possess sufficient rationality and autonomy to exercise rights has been revolutionary, yet it leaves intact the importance of these concepts as criteria for the exercise of rights" (17). Enhancing the civic inclusion of people with mental disabilities is, to be sure, a valid pursuit. But to make certain political processes (such as voting) more physically accessible would be an example of what Jay Dolmage terms a halfhearted "retrofit." In short, these practices apply a Band-Aid to the issue of exclusion from US democratic processes instead of questioning overarching structures of disenfranchisement.
Retrofitting democracy under the guise of creating a more just world for people with disabilities reinforces a historically racist and ability-based political system. This system perpetually excludes its subjects or only grants legibility within a rubric of humanistic reason. As political scientist Andrew Dilts concludes, "The true challenge presented by disenfranchisement is to not simply expand the boundaries of the polity by extending the right to vote to all, but to ask why suffrage so effectively does the work of normalizing, fixing, and 5. Russell's important work discusses citizenship in terms of the unruly body. I extend this discussion to mental disability. 6. Erevelles carefully develops a critique of liberal humanism's fraught relationship to cognitive disability. stabilizing political activity itself" (Dilts) . By noting the intertwined histories of disability and race, and their continued proximity in the public sphere, we might not only move away from a retrofitted approach to civic inclusion, but also question and even uproot the very processes through which we perform citizenship.7
Beetlejuice, Mental Disability, and Performing Citizenship
Performances by mentally disabled people are infrequently addressed by performance scholars and, with the exception of troupes such as Theatre HORA and Blue Apple Theatre, are not perceived as politicizing disability.8 My understanding of mental disability and performance is influenced by the rich body of scholarship on race and performance/performativity, which explores the (im)possibilities of agential performance under visual and carceral forms of subjugation.9 Nicole Fleetwood's theorization of blackness and performance in the visual field is particularly useful for considering intersections of race, performance, and mental disability insofar as she explores "how blackness becomes visually knowable through performance, cultural practices, and psychic manifestations" (6). Relatedly, we might question the ways in which we come to "know" mental disability and construct its representations in the visual field. By "visual field," I refer to highly mediated spectacles such as The Howard Stern Show, the Trayvon Martin trial, and news coverage of mentally disabled subjects such as Clinton Gode. The racialized dimensions of citizenship, I contend, are crucial to how we understand these representations.
The ways in which Lester "Beetlejuice" Green is prompted to perform black masculinity by his white interlocutors on Howard Stern's radio and television show reanimate the historically entwined discourses surrounding African Americans and mental disability-discourses which continue to inform notions of American citizenship and modernity. Howard Stern has occupied an ambivalent space in the US imaginary since the mid-1980s, often performing the role of the crass vigilante who proves himself a good citizen, pushing the envelope of political propriety in service of the larger democratic ideal of free speech. Stern's claim to fame is his allegedly indiscriminate approach 7. For a thorough and thought-provoking overview of mental disability and citizenship, see Caldwell, Harris, and Renko. 8. Hilton and Kuppers's "Outsider" discuss Theater HORA. See Kuppers's Disability and Contemporary Performance and Henderson and Ostrander for approaches to disability and performance. 9. See Muñoz; Fleetwood; Brooks; and Brown. to insulting just about anyone. While his misogyny is well documented, no scholarship has engaged this "shock jock's" treatment of race and disability.10 Through his radio show, television show, and official website, he stages scenarios wherein mentally disabled performers such as Beetlejuice fail to complete the performative rites of democracy. These performances are clearly intended to shore up Stern's own whiteness, masculinity, citizenship, and ability. This is important to note, not just in order to take Stern to task for his manifold aggressions, but also to illuminate the linkage between racism, ableism, and citizenship on a larger scale.
Beetlejuice's politically themed performances, in which he is costumed as Uncle Sam or runs for Senate, are intended by Stern to lampoon an uncritical American nationalism. The nation, Stern implies, is run by "idiots." Upon closer inspection, however, these skits suggest that African Americans and disabled people are not fit for full participation in US democracy. Their humor, a unilateral (and admittedly broad) jab at American policymakers, in effect cuts both ways, as it hinges on the audience's agreement that the image of (a person like) Beetlejuice as an active civic participant is laughable. Beetlejuice's disability, microcephaly, makes him especially susceptible to racialized forms of ableism.11 Since the mid-nineteenth century, microcephalic bodies have attracted notoriety through the traveling freak show. Entertainers were billed as an atavistic version of the modern human ("The Missing Link"), a wonder of human form ("The Pinhead"), or an unintelligible creature ("The What Is It?"). This combination of small stature, a small skull, and intellectual disability places the microcephalic performer at the intersection of discourses on physical and mental disability.
Questions of agency and citizenship provoked by these freak-show performances still resonate when considering the ways in which the mentally and physically anomalous performer is interpellated into racialized and gendered discourses. The life of William Henry Johnson, one of the most successful freak-show performers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, exemplifies these discourses. Johnson's tapered head shape initially gained the attention of P. T. Barnum, who costumed him in fur and billed him as the infamous "Zip the Pinhead." The anti-racist reclamation of Johnson after his death has relied on establishing that Johnson was in fact not microcephalic or mentally disabled, but instead became wealthy by conning freak-show 10. However, Rosenbaum discusses ableism in "shock jock" culture. 11. Microcephaly is a condition medically characterized by a "cranial vault that is smaller than normal […] as an indicator of an undersized brain," and is often accompanied by smaller stature and mental disability (Stevenson and Hall 696). audiences. This is an attractive narrative due to its emphasis on anti-racism and agential performance, but, as it claims that Johnson was a brilliant entrepreneur because he was not in fact mentally disabled, it warrants a disability critique. This has been a key point in retroactively granting Johnson full agency, while microcephalic performers such as Schlitzie the Pinhead (of Tod Browning's Freaks!) are still perceived as exploited laborers who lacked control over their bodies and work. Continuing this trend in the present, Beetlejuice was the center of a 2002 controversy regarding the legality of "dwarf tossing." When he was cited as an example of a performer who has willingly participated in dwarf-tossing events, Cara Egan, then-Vice President for Public Relations of Little People of America in Florida, "regarded Green as being exploited, not capable of making an informed choice" (Adelson) .
In the same way that earlier, exoticized "pinheads" were used as vehicles for ideas regarding American modernity and progress, the juxtaposition of Beetlejuice's race, diminutive stature, and mental disability constitutes a counter-representation that reifies white physical and mental superiority. His belligerent character negotiates the fraught relationship of disability to present-day entertainment by frustrating the possibility of identification or even pity. As a recurring guest on The Howard Stern Show, he performs a swearing, swaggering, drunken masculinity that often becomes aggressive when taunted by Howard Stern co-stars. Many of his appearances revolve around angry outbursts, pop-cultural ignorance, and the inability to spell or to recite the Pledge of Allegiance. Beetlejuice's performances stage a scenario wherein the spectator witnesses the "taming" of black masculinity. This power differential works to assuage the racial anxieties of white citizens as African Americans allegedly gain more visibility and leverage in entertainment.
These power imbalances are most apparent when Beetlejuice is interviewed by purportedly "witty" white men of average height, such as Stern, on The Howard Stern Show. Stern is careful to leave explicit racial discourse out of the majority of his interactions with Beetlejuice, preferring to focus on Beetlejuice's physical and mental disability as a source of humor. In the words Michelle Jarman used to describe the attitudes of a local authority toward the assault of an African American mentally disabled man, Stern "defuse[s] what he sees as the more volatile, divisive, and political issue of race by invoking the seemingly medical and individual issue of impairment. In this rhetorical maneuver, he relies upon a shared, cross-racial tolerance of disability prejudice to deflect accusations of racism" (90). We see this method of deflection used in Stern's realm of acceptable "shock" humor. His taunting of Beetlejuice initially appears more like camaraderie than aggression, as both Stern and Beetlejuice's manager position themselves as employers and providers for Beetlejuice. Both white men deflect attention away from the underlying racial tensions of their interactions and toward the more individualized and apolitical issue of disability. While Beetlejuice's race is off-limits, his height, illiteracy, speech, and teeth (all of which are also, it should be noted, implicitly racialized) are brought to the forefront as legitimate comedic topics.
This ridicule of Beetlejuice's illiteracy is especially highlighted in skits about American-ness and citizenship. In a 2007 radio appearance on The Howard Stern Show with Stern and co-host Robin Quivers, Beetlejuice arrives dressed as Uncle Sam. After the hosts speculate in his presence that Beetlejuice has "got some words to say. I don't know if any of them make sense" and wonder whether "he knows he's dressed as Uncle Sam," they ask him directly if he knows whom he is costumed as. Beetlejuice hands them a flag and responds, "I'm dressed like a clown," and more laughter ensues. As the hosts bait him with questions about the significance of September 11, 2001, the gag points out that Beetlejuice lacks the kinds of knowledge that allegedly constitute American citizenship, even as he's dressed in a costume that epitomizes American inclusivity.
In a similar twist on this parody, an interactive game for Beetlejuice's reality television show's website, thisisbeet.com, prompts the player to guess whether Beetlejuice will be able to answer a "simple" fill-in-the-blank question correctly: "We asked Beetle to simply fill in the blanks. Can you guess if he knows the correct answer? Either way, we all win." "The Beetlejuice Mismatch Game" asks the user to decide whether Beetlejuice will be able to fill in the blank for the phrases "Oh say can you ___" and "I pledge allegiance to the ___." After the user predicts Beet's response, a video of him appears with his reply to the question, such as, "I pledge allegiance to the fucking flag." The game does not test the player's own knowledge, but rather their ability to predict Beetlejuice's intellect. The rewards are twofold: the player can both be assured of their mental ability and civic fitness, and also find humor in Beet's seemingly nonsensical or irreverent answers.
Beetlejuice's disproving his own "American-ness," by being unable to answer simple trivia or to recognize figures such as Uncle Sam, eerily echoes the "literacy" tests given to black voters before the advent of the now-defunct Voting Rights Act. The first two questions of a 1965 Alabama literacy test that exemplify the sort of barriers that the VRA sought to prevent ask, "Which of the following is a right guaranteed by the Bill of Rights?" and "If a person is indicted for a crime, name two rights he has" (Jim Crow Museum). If a voter is unable to answer either of the questions-or if Beetlejuice cannot answer the jingoistic questions directed to him through this online game-then the desire to exclude "unproductive" racialized and disabled others from the realm of American citizenship is legitimated.
While these scenarios are intended as comedic displays of Beetlejuice's mental disability, they also dramatize the ways in which exclusionary language and knowledge construction laid the foundations of American citizenship. Intentionally or not, they are also a microcosmic staging of an ongoing debate about the moral and agential status of mentally disabled people and whether they can perform the rites of citizenship. Philosopher Martha Nussbaum writes of people with mental disabilities in civic settings that, "People with limited ability to read, people who easily become confused or fearful in a new setting, may be excluded from voting and jury service de facto" (88). Nussbaum calls for more "sensitive thought" on this issue; however, the unavailability of civic participation for mentally disabled persons is not merely due to a dearth of "sensitive thought," but also to the structural exclusion of racialized and disabled others who do not fit the mold of American identity. These state laws tend to be justified as protections against voter fraud, citing imagined scenarios wherein masses of conniving caretakers sway the mentally disabled voter to choose the candidate of their choice.
Beetlejuice's "failed" embodiment is put on trial in tandem with his mental disability to further authorize his exclusion from civic participation. During an appearance in which he is dressed in military fatigues, he claims he has served in Vietnam. Stern balks and insists this is impossible because of the "height requirement," suggesting Beetlejuice's body obstructs his capacity to embody the patriotic image of military masculinity. Segments where the 4′3″ Beetlejuice is taunted into employing an ineffective physical defense against larger white men display him as a public embodiment of black aggression that can be tamed. The 2008 bit "Senator Beetlejuice" continues this theme of mock authority and failed citizenship by featuring a group of people with mental disabilities picketing in Times Square in support of Beetlejuice's "campaign" for Senate. As we see Beetlejuice posing as a senator running for office, the voiceover urges the listener to vote for "a pint-sized shrunken head black man with a mission," followed by Gary the Retard, a mentally disabled cast member, insisting that "Beetlejuice speaks the truth." In the absence of any intent to radicalize or critique the system of democracy, this bit calls attention to the exclusionary practices of an allegedly all-encompassing national democracy by baldly showing people with mental disabilities (and their meaningless votes) to be its detritus.
The Howard Stern Show's ethos is unquestionably hinged on the entertainment value of mocking mentally disabled people and constructing neurotypicality. But Beetlejuice's own performances within this medium challenge the stereotypical image of the mentally disabled subject as perpetually joyful and unaware of their exterior conditions. The improvisational nature of his performance creates tension through the threat of surprise and the lack of adherence to an intelligible script. Even if the mentally disabled performer's actions are scripted, the assumption that people with cognitive disabilities cannot act upon social cues elicits anxiety and pleasure from the audience. But Beetlejuice's routines create the possibility of confronting and even thwarting the ableist gaze. Resisting the temptation to valorize Beetlejuice's moments of defiance through liberal-humanist notions of emancipation, I see his refusals as expanding the repertoire of power, typically polarized as domination-versus-resistance, to include other affects and actions, such as silent refusal.
During a 2007 interview on The Howard Stern Show, for example, Beetlejuice enters the studio in an uncompliant mood. Stern prods him to enter a more professional or entertaining state, and finally gives up, sighing, "Well this is not a very good appearance […] . Don't you want to make money?" Eventually Beetlejuice threatens to commit suicide, and the hosts attempt to cheer him up by mocking his stature and sexuality. This interview, initially slotted for 20 minutes of comedy, turns out to be quite slow-paced and uncomfortable. In this manner, Beetlejuice thwarts expectations for him to be perpetually "lively" and entertaining. His refusal to comply with Stern's requests to "cheer up" also points to the failure of an improvisational comedy predicated on power imbalance, especially when the subject does not allow himself to be interpellated.12
In other performances, Beetlejuice's humor and comedic timing compose a vital part of his apathetic reactions to Stern's Socratic approach. He slyly acknowledges his mental disability, claiming he can become a boxer because he is "used to brain damage." He also demeans white guests on the show who mock his lack of verbal mastery, instead rejecting their emphasis on articulate language as a marker of intelligence by declaring, "I ain't no motherfucking poet like you." The anticlimactic nature and awkward staging typical of improvisation allow him to refuse, in the words of the late José Esteban Muñoz, the "burden of liveness" placed upon disabled performers of color (189).
12. On a second appearance with guest Gilbert Gottfried, Beetlejuice refuses to interact with Gottfried and stares into the distance while Stern and Quivers beg him to engage. Beet eventually walks out of the studio, explaining, "What am I gonna do? Sit there and do everything all day?" Rachel Jeantel and the Letter I read the spectacles of Beetlejuice's performances, Gode's case, and, finally, Rachel Jeantel's testimony together to reiterate that the persecutions of racial and intellectual otherness in the USA are not merely analogous but rather mutually constitutive oppressions. In "Unspeakable Offenses: Untangling Race and Disability in Discourses of Intersectionality," Nirmala Erevelles and Andrea Minear argue that "individuals located perilously at the interstices of race, class, gender, and disability are constituted as non-citizens and (no)bodies by the very social institutions (legal, educational, and rehabilitational) that are designed to protect, nurture, and empower them" (129). In addition to the harrowing stories that Erevelles and Minear tell of Eleanor Bumpurs, Junius Wilson, and Cassie Smith, I conclude with Jeantel's testimony at the 2013 trial of George Zimmerman, which further highlights the fatal dimensions of evaluating civic fitness.
In February 2012, Zimmerman shot unarmed African American teenager Trayvon Martin and pleaded self-defense, claiming that Martin assaulted him first. Martin's friend Rachel Jeantel served as a key witness in Zimmerman's 2013 trial as she was on the phone with Martin minutes before his death. In response to defense attorney Don West's suggestion that Martin was lying about his intent to assault Zimmerman, Jeantel replied, "That's real retarded, sir." Decontextualized, the utterance "That's real retarded sir" could be interpreted as a kind of ironic indictment of the prosecutor or, alternately, as an act of noncompliance on Jeantel's part. However, in the context of the testimony, it is both and neither; rather, the phrase expresses her incredulity at the possibility of Martin provoking Zimmerman. Skeptics used this moment to turn Jeantel's words against her, arguing that she was in fact mentally disabled.
Jeantel's credibility was widely discussed during the court case, and her authority was further damaged by her inability to read a letter written in cursive that she had dictated to a friend. The spectacle of West demanding that Jeantel read the letter aloud dramatizes the rationalist emphasis on literacy over intuitive knowledges. In order for Jeantel to be a reliable witness, she must be able to read, once again evoking the ways in which Jim Crow-era literacy tests haunt the margins of citizenship. As the Haitian-and DominicanAmerican daughter of immigrant parents, her legitimacy as a participant in US democratic processes, such as testifying in court, is also placed on trial. Both her testimony and her retort resulted in widespread counteraccusations that Jeantel had a learning disability, implying that the inability to read cursive writing, framed as a mental disability, disqualified her as a valid witness. Many blamed Jeantel's testimony for causing Zimmerman's acquittal and have lambasted her for not adhering to a politics of black middleclass respectability.13 Furthermore, the persistent comparison of Jeantel to Precious, the heroine of Sapphire's 1996 novel-turned-film, places Jeantel into a predetermined visual matrix of blackness and disability.14 In Sarah Ahmed's terms, Precious's illiteracy "sticks" to her fat black female body, and these markers are transferred wholesale onto Jeantel. As a dark-skinned child of immigrants (a fact that news outlets have repeatedly emphasized), Jeantel is interpellated into mental and physical stigma despite her firm insistence that "I don't understand you, I do understand English."
Claiming agency for people of color and people with disabilities, in the face of white supremacist and ableist doubt, is often the kneejerk reaction to racial and ability-based injustice. It is tempting to read Jeantel's testimony exclusively as a sly rebuttal to white standard English, or Beetlejuice's performances as a mode of "staring back."15 As these instances remind us, presumed mental disability is not the sole disqualifier of citizenship-the persistent racialization of mental disability contributes to these discourses. Many of the decisions about these exclusions are made judicially, but they are also made in the visual field of media and performance, where viewers encounter images that confirm, extend, or refute their notions of who counts as civically fit. In light of the persistent devaluation of black, disabled, and black disabled lives, tied intimately to the failures of the civic and juridical sphere, we must interrogate how repositioning marginalized actors as agential reifies a historically racist and ableist litmus test of rationality.
